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ABSTRACT
The Depression-era Supreme Court decision Home
Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell has been reviled as
one of the worst in the history of the high court. This paper
argues that it was one of the most prescient and practical of its
decisions.
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The 1934 Supreme Court case Home Building and
Loan Association v. Blaisdell1 made the list as one of The Dirty
Dozen, a book authored by Robert A. Levy and William Melor
in 2008.2 The authors argue that Blaisdell, among others
selected to their list of dishonor, ranks among the worst
overreaches of government power sanctioned by the United
States Supreme Court.
This article argues that the contrary is the case: that the
decision was prescient in anticipating and signaling a change in
the courts pro-business approach in 1937. It also demonstrated
the court’s deference to a state’s decision to invoke its
emergency powers to aid citizens caught in the economic
disaster of the Great Depression.
The Dirty Dozen which added Blaisdell to the list of
“bad decisions” by the high court, first appeared in 2008, just
as the impact of the “Great Recession” was taking hold in the
United States.3
This paper leaves it to the reader to judge if Blaisdell
was a “bad decision” and also raises the question of why states
did not intervene to protect their citizens in 2008-13 as they did
in the 1930s.
The Background of the Case
In 1933, the state passed the Minnesota Mortgage
Moratorium Act. The legislature was aware of the challenges
facing farmers and home owners during the Depression.4
Because many could not pay the mortgages that were due on
their land and houses, the law allowed courts to prevent
foreclosures even where the property owners had defaulted on
their payments.
John and Rosella Blaisdell used the law to prevent their
14 room house and garage from being foreclosed upon even
though they were paying a small amount to the lender each
month.5 The Home Building and Loan Association went to
court to obtain its money but the state court ruled in favor of
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the Blaisdells, that the law protected them from having to pay
more than $40.00 per month which was the fair rental value of
the property.6
The case turned on Article I section 10 of the
Constitution which states:
“…No state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of
contracts”…7
The clause, placed in the Constitution in 1787 at the
urging of Rufus King, a delegate from Massachusetts, had its
origin in the economic crisis in the fledging United States in
the 1780s.8
Many Americans could not pay their debts and two
points of view on the problem emerged. Creditors maintained
that just debts should be paid since they had been legally
incurred by the borrowers and through “hard work and
frugality” the obligations should and could be met.9
On the other side were advocates of compassion for
those who found themselves in financial distress. Some states
passed laws that imposed delays on lawsuits brought by
creditors to collect their debts.10 Among the consequences of
these laws was reluctance on the part of lenders to extend
credit since there was uncertainty about their ability to
eventually collect what was owed.
One of the most alarming events from the point of view
of the propertied class was Shays Rebellion in 1786-1787.
That uprising was led by small farmers who found themselves
unable to pay their debts and taxes. Their plan was to prevent
court sessions from being held to protect creditor rights.11
Ostensibly the reason for convening the Constitutional
Convention in 1787 was to amend the governing document,
allowing the Articles of Confederation, which contained no
provision allowing the national government to intervene to
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ameliorate the debt crisis.
The convention resolved to prohibit states from meddling in
private contracts like the ones between creditors and debtors.12
Since the “contracts” clause contained very few words,
the Supreme Court had to interpret what it meant, an
opportunity that arose in some early cases most notably
Fletcher v. Peck13 and Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward.14
Even though the clause did not distinguish between
public and private agreements, Fletcher v. Peck dealt with the
issue of public contracts. In that case, Chief Justice John
Marshall used the contract clause to prevent Georgia from
trying to avoid the consequences of land grants the state had
made years earlier.
In the most prominent case involving the clause,
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, the Marshall
court prevented the New Hampshire legislature from altering
the 1769 charter that authorized the creation of the college.
From these early cases and others decided in the latter
part of the 19th century, it was clear that the court established
the parameters within which the Contract clause cases would
be decided. The court determined that the clause applied to
existing contracts not to future agreements. The court also
believed that it was the intent of the framers of the Constitution
to bar government interference with contracts that had already
been made in accordance with laws that were in place at the
time.15
It was also clear, and this became the salient point in
Blaisdell, that the Contract clause is not superior to the police
power of the states.16 The latter power, which has never been
ceded to the federal government, permits the state to exercise
all powers that are necessary to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of its people.17 The principles of the Contract clause

2014 / Home Building / 26

and the state’s police power collided in the Blaisdell case.
When the Blaisdells borrowed $3800.00 from the Home
Building and Loan, they agreed to a mortgage on their home
and land and that, if they defaulted, the lender could sell the
property.18 The Building and Loan put the property up for sale
and then bought it for the amount of the mortgage which was in
accordance with the original contract. Under the Minnesota
law in effect when the Blaisdell’s bought the property and
when the Building and Loan eventually purchased it, the latter
became the owner.19
Under the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act
however, the legislation declared because there was an
economic emergency, the lender could not foreclose on the
property even if the debtor did not pay his obligation.20
Upholding the law the Minnesota Supreme Court
delayed the transfer of title to the Building and Loan for two
years and ordered the Blaisdells to pay $40 each month and
live in the house. If they paid the monthly fee, the Blaisdells
could again pay the mortgage once the two years were up.21
To some, especially hard-passed debtors, this seemed
like a fair bargain, but to those who were defenders of contract
rights, it seemed as though the lender was being denied its
rights to own and sell the property which put the Building and
Loan in a vulnerable position subject to declining property
values as the Depression continued.22
THE HUGHES MAJORITY v. THE SUTHERLAND
DISSENT
The Supreme Court decision split 5-4. Voting with the
majority were Justices Brandeis, Stone, Roberts and Cardozo.23
The minority consisted of the so-called “Four Horsemen of the
Apocalypse”, Willis Van Devanter, Pierce Butler, James
McReynolds and the author of the dissenting opinion, George
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Sutherland.24 These justices formed the conservative core of
the court, striking down virtually all New Deal legislation that
came before it.
The author of the majority opinion Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes emphasized that the police power of the
states is basic to the federal system, noting that the economic
emergency did not justify its existence but did justify the use of
the power.25
The Depression created the need for the use of the
police power because of the dire conditions it had created for
homeowners.
Hughes conceded that the Minnesota law was the kind
that the contract clause was designed to prevent. In fact, early
cases had voided similar laws.26
Hughes believed that the Constitution should be
interpreted differently given the current conditions. An earlier
precedent, Bronson v. Kinzie27, appeared to be a case directly
on point. Illinois had passed a law as a response to the Panic of
1837. The legislation allowed debtors to buy property sold at a
foreclosure sale by paying the purchase price and 10% interest.
The court struck down the law violative of the contract
clause.28
Hughes seemed to believe that such precedents did not
apply to the Blaisdell case. He preferred that the court apply
cases which held that “the state…continues to possess authority
to safeguard the vital interests of its people.”29 Significantly,
he wrote:
The economic interest of the state
may justify the exercise of its continuing
and dominant protective power
notwithstanding interference with contracts.30

According to Hughes, the contract clause does not,
therefore, prohibit all impairment of contractual obligations.
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Hughes stated that the Court had a growing
appreciation of “public needs and of the necessity of finding
ground for a rational compromise between individual rights
and public welfare.”31
The originalist interpretation of the Constitution holds
that “what the provision of the Constitution meant to the vision
of that day it must mean to the vision of our time.”32
Hughes believed that a judge could not fully know the
meaning of a constitutional provision until he had considered
the social and political background of the case.33 A critic
would argue that Hughes’ approach places no constraints on
the exercise of judicial power: The Constitution is whatever
the justices of the Supreme Court at any given time say it is.
The basic premise of Justice Sutherland’s dissent is that
what the contract clause meant when “framed and adopted”, it
should mean for all time.34
A provision of the Constitution….
does not mean one thing at one
time and an entirely different thing at
another time.”35
Sutherland was particularly disdainful of the majority’s
argument that “an essential attribute of sovereign power is to
safeguard the vital interest of its people.”36 Sutherland
questioned whether Blaisdell’s financial problems affected the
fundamental interest of the state.
Sutherland believed that there were certain activities
within the police power of the state, like “banning the sale or
manufacturing of intoxicating liquors” or preventing “private
parties from creating harmful nuisances.37 Debt relief did not
fall into that category since the loan to the Blaisdell’s was legal
when it was made and similarl loans were legal even after the
moratorium law went into effect.38
In Sutherland’s view all the Minnesota legislature
enabled the Blaisdells to avoid their obligations under a
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contract they had entered and prevented the Building and Loan
from enforcing an obligation that was as lawful after the statute
was passed as it was before.39
The majority opinion believed that the relief provided
by the statute was “reasonable and appropriate” since the
Blaisdells had to eventually pay the mortgage. Only time for
payment had been extended and during the extension period
the Blaisdells still had to pay a monthly rent to the lender.40
Sutherland worried about the latter’s plight more than
that of the impoverished homeowner. Sutherland believed that
the rental was scant compensation for the lender’s inability to
foreclose. Sutherland wondered about the impact on the
lenders interests should the quality of the building deteriorate
and the value of property fall below the purchase price.41
Hughes’ majority opinion and Sutherland’s dissent
represent opposite poles of constitutional interpretation.
Hughes believed that a provision of the Constitution has little
meaning in the abstract, that it should be interpreted in the
context of the entire Constitution and the “social situation
confronting the court.42
Thus, there can be different results despite the
similarity in the facts of the case depending on the point in time
in which the case is decided.
Sutherland repudiated such a position stating that the
Founding Fathers fixed the meaning of the Contract clause in
all cases for all time. As Sutherland and the dissenters read the
Contract clause, the mortgage moratorium law was
unconstitutional.43
THE EFFECT OF BLAISDELL TODAY
While most commentators agree that Blaisdell rendered
the Contract clause virtually moribund, there were two cases
decided by the Court in the 1970s that belied that notion:
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey44 and Allied Structural
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Steel Co. V. Spannaus.45
In the United States Trust Co. case, the Court struck
down a New Jersey law that impaired the rights of bondholders
by repealing a covenant that barred the use of bond funds for
mass transit. The court found that the impairment of the bond
holders rights was not “necessary” since lesser measures could
have been used to serve the state’s goals.46
In the Allied Structural Steel case decided in 1978, the
Supreme Court struck down a Minnesota law that impaired a
private agreement. The law required that an employer who
ended a pension plan or left the state had to fund pensions for
workers with ten years of service to the company even if their
rights were not vested under the original plan. The court found
that this law significantly altered the obligations of employers
under existing private pension fund contracts.47
Since its decision in the Allied case it appears that the
Supreme Court has reverted to a Blaisdell like approach. In
three cases,48 the Court has made it clear that in cases involving
the impairment of private contracts, it will defer to state’s
judgment of reasonableness and necessity.
It appears that the present Supreme Court defers to state
legislatures’ determinations of the need to abrogate a contract.
The Court first determines if the state law involves a
“substantial impairment of a contract.49 If there is a substantial
impairment, a state can argue that the law has “significant and
legitimate public purpose” such as a alleviating a social or
economic situation.50 But as subsequent cases indicate, the
problem need not necessarily be an emergency. For example
in Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light
Co., the Court upheld a law that capped price increases under a
natural gas supply contract, which was an economic hardship
not a national economic crisis.51
Finally the Court will not approve changes to the
parties’ contract if they are unreasonable and unrelated to the
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purpose of the law.52
That the courts are unlikely to overturn state laws that
abrogate contracts whose purpose is to remedy an economic
hardship is evidenced by lower federal court action in
connection with two natural disasters.53 When Hurricane
Andrew struck Florida in 1992, it was then the most expensive
storm in United States history (later surpassed by Hurricane
Katrina in 2005)54 causing property damage amounting to $1618 billion.
Because the insurance companies had written policies
and charged premiums that were inadequate to cover the
damage inflicted by Andrew, some insurance companies went
bankrupt. After the storm, the companies that remained in
business cancelled policies and did not renew others.55
In response, the state legislature passed and Governor
Lawton Chiles signed legislation to bar the cancellation or nonrenewal of homeowner’s policies for six months.56
In Veta Fire Insurance Corp. v. State of Florida,57 the
Court of Appeals dismissed the Contract Clause argument by
the insurance company holding “the statute’s impact on
existing insurance contracts cannot be said to be a
constitutional impairment.”58
In 2005 Hurricane Katrina struck several southern
states including Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama. Then
Hurricane Rita hit southwestern Louisiana. Again the
insurance companies were hit with extraordinary losses – in
excess of $60 billion.59 Under Louisiana law the companies
had to allow policy holders twelve months to submit claims.
The Louisiana legislature passed a law signed by
Governor Kathleen Blanco which extended the time period for
the filing of claims to two years. The insurance companies
sued claiming that Louisiana impaired their contractual
obligations.60 In State of Louisiana v. All Property and
Casualty Insurance Carriers Authorized and Licensed to Do
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Business in the State of Louisiana61 the court held that
measures taken by the legislature were both “appropriate and
reasonable in order to protect the rights of the citizens of
Louisiana and their general welfare”.62 The courts in both
cases based their decisions on Blaisdell and its progeny.
Senator Ellen Anderson (DFL – St. Paul) and
Representative Jim Davnie (DFL-Minneapolis) introduced the
Minnesota Subprime Foreclosure Deferment Act of 2008 to
stop foreclosures of sub-prime or negative amortization63 loans
for one year although homeowners would have had to make
minimum monthly payments.64 The one-year grace period
would have allowed homeowners time to negotiate with their
lenders while awaiting a federal program.
The legislators estimated that at least 15,000
homeowners of approximately 33,500 were expected to face
foreclosure.65
Andersen and Davnie emphasized that their bill differed
from the old Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act which was
broader in scope. The 2008 version would have required
lenders to cancel sheriffs foreclosure auctions for one year if
the homeowner had a subprime or negative amortization loans
made between Jan 1, 2001 and August 1, 2007.66
While homeowners would have had to continue making
payments, they would have to pay than less 65% of the
payments they were making when they defaulted or the
minimum payment they made when they first got their loan. If
the homeowner missed a payment, the foreclosure action
would resume.67
The bill did not explain how property owners would
later make up the money they did not pay during the grace
period. Apparently that matter would have been left to
negotiations between the banks and the homeowners.
Prentiss Cox, a law professor at the University of
Minnesota, stated that the 1933 act was far more sweeping, but
argued that because of the current crisis the state should
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intervene as “a response to abusive and unfair subprime
lending that went unchecked for a decade.”68
The bill passed both Houses despite opposition
mounted by the American Securitization Forum (ASF) and the
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
(SIFMA). Both groups argued that the law would result in
increased costs for all borrowers and the possibility that the
supply of money to the mortgage market would dry up.69
The argument became academic when Republican
Governor Tim Pawlenty vetoed the bill. The Governor issued a
written statement.
No other state in the nation has
enacted a bill like (this). There is
a reason for that, it is not sound policy.70
The bill was never reintroduced but, given its modest
provisions and the attitude of the Supreme Court in Blaisdell
and in subsequent cases discussed here, it would likely have
been upheld.
CONCLUSION
It is the duty of government to protect its citizens and
the states have a weapon to do so: the police power. In the
face of the greatest threat to the survival of the country: the
Great Depression, Minnesota acted to protect homeowners
from mass foreclosure.
To claim as Sutherland did that
the value of money being held
constant, without the consent of
the debtor, the mortgage moratorium
statute of issue in Blaisdell represented
an awkward, perhaps even clumsy,
effort at the state level to undo the
mischief brought on by federal action.
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The state statute can be justified
not as an effort to correct market
outcomes but as an effort to correct
government misconduct – meddling
with private contracts – that falls within
the traditional confines of the police
power.71
The issue in Blaisdell was far more complex than the
3800.00 owed by the family. The decision may have
undermined the Contract Clause but enhanced the state’s police
power and gave the latter the right to protect its citizens to even
the playing field between creditors and borrowers.72
The Supreme Court may well have to address even
more ambitious efforts by the states and municipalities to
assuage the adverse effects of the Great Recession. Many
cities are embracing the concept of eminent domain as a device
to seize homes that are underwater.
The Home Affordable Modification Program has not
produced results many had hoped for because it relies on banks
to deal with the crisis.73
Evidence shows that entities like the Bank of America
“denied mortgage modifications to qualified homeowners,
falsely claimed not to have received necessary paperwork,
falsified electronic records, ignored properly completed
applications, denied applications en masse because the
paperwork was no longer current, and gave employees bonuses
for pushing homeowners who qualified for modification
because foreclosures were more profitable.”74
During the housing bubble, banks bundled mortgages
and sold securities backed by the loans. Since the banks do not
own these securitized mortgages, they only service these
mortgages for investors.75 Therefore they have little incentive
to expend the to negotiate a modification.
The bankers have threatened to sue and to cutback on
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their lending so some communities have backed off. But other
municipalities are forging ahead: to buy mortgages that are
likely to end up in foreclosure and negotiate new ones that
homeowners can afford.76
When the economic system fails can there be any doubt
that the states can and should exercise the police power? As a
result of the Blaisdell case, the states can take steps to protect
its citizens and its communities.
In Blaisdell, Chief Justice Hughes recognized that the
dire economic conditions created by the Depression justified
the Courts decision. The Minnesota law was one of many
passed during the period in the wake of mass violence and an
avalanche of foreclosures and forced sales.77 Lenders were able
to take advantage of farmers at foreclosure sales, paying paltry
sums for what ordinarily would have been valuable property.78
As one author has put it, “…if there was ever a time
and place for debtor relief, Minnesota was the place.”79 The
legislature passed the law for good reasons and a nondiscriminatory purpose. In the 1780s the debtor protection law
passed by the states that so concerned the farmers
discriminated in favor of their own citizens against out of state
creditors.80
The Minnesota law only dealt with in-state mortgage its
purpose was not to harm creditor interests but to protect the
state’s economy. It was sound public policy. The law may
have impaired mortgagor’s rights but did not abrogate them.
One is left to wonder why more states did not attempt
to take similar action during the Great Recession of 2008-2013.
Was it the timidity of the politicians or the power of the
banking interests that caused so many foreclosures and
dislocations?
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